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Book Review 
AUTOCRAT OF THE ARMCHAIR 
DAVID F. LEVI† 
Richard Posner is a marvel.1 He carries a full caseload as a U.S. 
circuit judge on the Seventh Circuit, teaches at the University of 
Chicago Law School, blogs with a Nobel Prize–winning economist 
(Gary Becker), and writes at least a book a year as well as any 
number of articles. His opinions are nicely written and explained. His 
scholarly writing covers a wide range of academic and public policy 
topics, from sex to literature, from jurisprudence to aging. Any large 
issue or event, such as the impeachment of a president or the 
treatment of captured Al Qaida members, is likely to elicit an 
interesting and thorough treatment of the topic from Judge Posner. 
Somehow he manages to be in the thick of things without diminishing 
his judicial role, although it is not unlikely that his more provocative 
academic writing kept him from an appointment to the United States 
Supreme Court in the 1980s. By all accounts, he is also a generous 
judicial and academic colleague. How he does all of this is one of the 
mysteries. Perhaps the explanation is simple: he is brilliant, hard 
working, and intellectually fearless. He is all of these things and more. 
But is he an empiricist? 
To be more precise, as a researcher who purports to describe 
how most judges think at all levels of the legal system, does he 
identify a reliable, sufficiently large data set and then apply 
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District Judge for the Eastern District of California (1990–2007), Chair and Member of the Civil 
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Practice and Procedure (2003–2007). I am grateful to Mitu Gulati, Ernest Young, Lauren 
Collins, and Jennifer Dominguez for their many helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank 
the Duke Law Journal for its part in organizing this Symposium and particularly for its 
understanding of why this subject matter is of such importance. 
 1. Judge Posner is a great admirer of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. See THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). The allusion in 
the title is to Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.’s popular Atlantic Monthly column, The Autocrat of the 
Breakfast-Table. 
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appropriate statistical tests to the data such that others can evaluate 
the strength of his generalizations and replicate his conclusions using 
the same or other reliable data sets? Put somewhat differently, if 
Judge Posner were to take the stand as an expert on how most judges 
think most of the time, would his testimony be based upon “sufficient 
facts or data” to qualify as “reliable” under the Federal Rules 
governing admissibility of expert testimony?2 Furthermore, as a 
distinguished judge who advocates for a particular approach to 
judging, an approach he calls “pragmatism,”3 does he give sufficient 
attention to the need for reliable “empirics”: transparent factfinding 
that can be challenged and tested, at the very least, by the parties to 
the litigation? 
These questions might seem impertinent, even churlish. After all, 
Judge Posner has written several articles and at least one book that 
draw heavily on databases to answer questions about the legal 
system.4 He is one of the founders of law and economics, and has 
been a key part in the upsurge of law and economics scholarship and 
law and social science research more generally, much of which 
consists of empirical study. 
Judge Posner is certainly capable of empirical work and 
understands how it is done and its importance. But in his latest work 
on judging, How Judges Think,5 he is no empiricist unless we are 
satisfied with “armchair empiricism.” His generalizations about the 
ways of the judge and the world are ex cathedra pronouncements that 
generally lack any identified objective support outside of his own 
 
 2. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Testimony by Experts, provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) 
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. The notes to Rule 702 caution: “If the witness is relying solely or primarily 
on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion 
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is 
reliably applied to the facts.” Id. advisory committee’s note; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585–98 (1993). 
 3. See text accompanying infra note 13. 
 4. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
(1996); Tomas Philipson & Richard A. Posner, A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the 
Effects of Public Health Subsidies for STD Testing, 110 Q.J. ECON. 2 (1995); Richard A. Posner, 
The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and Legal Analysis, 12 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1 
(2004). 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
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experience and belief. For many of his assertions, it would appear that 
his dataset of judges is a set of one—himself. Further, as an advocate 
for a particular kind of pragmatic judging—consciously and explicitly 
making law embodying sound social policy—Judge Posner gives little 
or no attention to the critical, what I would call “empirical,” question: 
How does the judge, particularly the appellate judge, know what the 
consequences of a new rule of law will be and whether those 
consequences are likely to be good for society? These are contestable 
issues that can be the subject of testimony and challenge within the 
courtroom and the litigation process. When the record is not 
developed, how does the judge make sound decisions about the social 
policy consequences of different legal rules?6 
I write from the perspective of one who served as a U.S. district 
judge for almost seventeen years and who was deeply involved in the 
federal rulemaking process. Much of what I have to say about the 
book stems from these two experiences. These experiences and that 
perspective lead me to question a description of judging that pays so 
little attention to the average case or to the processes of fair 
adjudication, including the roles of the advocate and of our 
procedural rules and practices. Indeed, one detects not just Judge 
Posner’s well-known disdain for legal formalism,7 but something else 
more troubling and fundamental: a resistance to the limitations on a 
judge that are basic to our system, particularly that judges sit to 
decide the issues actually presented within the confines of a particular 
 
 6. For example, a party might contend that affirmative action programs in professional 
schools are necessary to the development of leaders in the military and in business. See Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). This assertion can be established or contested by 
expert testimony, based upon data and statistical tests, or perhaps by other evidence, including 
personal experience, offered under oath and subject to cross-examination. Without such 
evidence and testing processes, however, a judge would have no reliable basis for believing or 
disbelieving the mere assertion of this causal relationship. Appellate judges who go beyond the 
record to rely on factual contentions in amicus briefs or academic literature that have never 
been tested in the courtroom, that have been “mailed in,” and that would not be admissible, 
start down a perilous path inconsistent with the carefully constructed truth-seeking process that 
has served well for many years. 
 7. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 371–72 (“Legalists invent canons of construction 
(principles of interpretation) and distinctions between dictum and holding; embrace statutory 
and constitutional literalism but carve narrow exceptions for literal readings that produce 
absurd results; exalt rules over standards; [and] wash their hands of messy factual issues by 
adopting principles of deferential appellate review . . . .”); Richard A. Posner, What Has 
Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1663 (1990) (“Legal formalism is the idea 
that legal questions can be answered by inquiry into the relation between concepts and hence 
without need for more than a superficial examination of their relation to the world of fact. It is, 
therefore, anti-pragmatic as well as anti-empirical.”). 
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case and record. One senses that for this judge—a brilliant man 
steeped in economics and academic learning, eager to make his mark 
on the development of the law and to exercise his broad lawmaking 
powers in the tradition of the great appellate lawgivers—such matters 
as precedent, the procedural posture of a case, the strategic decisions 
of the lawyers to advance certain positions and forgo others, and the 
actual facts in the record simply get in the way.8 
Judge Posner’s basic point is that judicial decisionmaking is not 
governed strictly by logic or the reasoned application of the law—text 
and prior decisions—to facts, a process he calls “legalism” and the 
adherents of which he calls “legalists.” According to Posner, “there is 
a pronounced political element in the decisions of American judges, 
including federal trial and intermediate appellate judges and U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices.”9 There is also a personal element to judging, 
he avers, because a judge’s personal characteristics “such as race and 
sex; personality traits, such as authoritarianism; and professional and 
life experiences, such as having been a prosecutor or having grown up 
in turbulent times influence judging.”10 Political and personal factors, 
according to Posner, generate preconceptions, often unconscious, that 
affect judicial decision making.11 
Furthermore, Judge Posner contends that there is a significant 
legislative aspect to judging; judges inevitably must make the law in 
the open areas where the law is unclear and undeveloped. According 
to Posner, this lawmaking role is unavoidable: “A combination of 
structural and cultural factors imposes a legislative role on our judges 
that they cannot escape.”12 Having established to his satisfaction that 
legalism fails to explain judicial behavior and that the legalist 
approach cannot resolve cases in the open areas of the law, Posner 
offers his own template for judging, an approach he calls 
“pragmatism” and describes as “basing judgments . . . on 
consequences, rather than on deduction from premises in the manner 
of a syllogism.”13 
 
 8. See generally Linda E. Fisher, Pragmatism is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public 
Policy and Empirical Reality, 31 N.M. L. REV. 455, 491–92 (2001) (documenting how Judge 
Posner’s “pragmatist agenda” leads to his reliance on “extra-record facts”). 
 9. POSNER, supra note 5, at 369–70. 
 10. Id. at 370. 
 11. Id. at 11. Relying upon Bayesian decision theory, he calls such preconceptions 
“Bayesian priors.” Id. at 67; see also infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 12. POSNER, supra note 5, at 372. 
 13. Id. at 40. 
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Curiously, Judge Posner considers that these are controversial 
claims, even ones as banal as the claim that judges make the law by 
applying it to new fact settings or that judges could be influenced by 
their own life experiences. These claims may have been shocking in 
the late nineteenth century when Justice Holmes asserted that history 
has more to do with the development of the law than logic,14 but in a 
post legal-realist world, these claims are the new orthodoxy. 
According to Posner, however, most judges would vociferously deny 
that their decisions are ever influenced in the slightest by “political”15 
or personal considerations, and most judges pretend that they are 
finding the law and not making it.16 For what it’s worth, from the ease 
of my own armchair, I would take just the opposite position: I would 
say that most judges are more than aware that they are “making law,” 
in the sense of amplifying it, when they apply precedents or statutory 
language to particular factual settings. I would also contend that most 
judges, particularly the very best ones, are acutely aware of the 
 
 14. “The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men 
should be governed.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). The idea that legal materials sometimes leave an 
open area within which the judge is freer to develop the law goes back many years. See H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–50 (1961); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 348–56 
(Max Knight trans., Univ. of Calif. Press 1967) (1934); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL REASONING 2–3, 7 (1949). 
 15. Judge Posner continues the unfortunate use of the term “political”—with its overtone 
of partisan bias—to describe a judge’s reliance on judicial philosophy. Judge Michael Boudin, a 
participant in this Symposium, comments upon the misleading use of the term in one of his 
contributions to this Issue. See Michael Boudin, A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting 
Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, 58 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688 (2009) (calling the 
“political” label of a judicial opinion “mere provocation”). For a compelling argument that 
much of what Posner and others think of as “political” is actually quite consistent with legal 
decisionmaking, see Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the 
Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14–15, 18–21. 
 16. Judge Posner pokes a good deal of fun at Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. He 
repeatedly points to and then mocks the Chief Justice’s assertion at his confirmation hearing 
that judges are like baseball umpires who just apply the rules to the facts as they unfold on the 
ground. E.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 78–81; see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005). Yet even Judge Posner concedes that much of the time this 
is exactly what judges do, POSNER, supra note 5, at 8, although one doubts that it is what 
Supreme Court Justices do much of the time, see Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration 
and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 708 (2007) (“Supreme Court Justices cannot even 
agree on the basic contours of the ‘strike zone’ . . . because the constitutional text itself is 
indeterminate and the potential source materials for gleaning its meaning in particular settings 
are both numerous and contested.”). 
LEVI IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:32:08 PM 
1796 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1791 
potential of personal factors, including judicial philosophy, life 
experience, and personality, to affect how judges approach and then 
decide legal issues. I would further say that part of the art of judging 
rests in recognizing the existence of these potential influences and 
then dealing with them in some appropriate way, depending on the 
nature and strength of the influence. 
There are a number of problems with Judge Posner’s 
descriptions and prescriptions. Most fundamentally, much of what he 
asserts about how judges think is just assertion, lacking any factual 
support in empirical study or even anecdote. One suspects that most 
of Posner’s claims are based on examination of his own decisional 
processes or, perhaps, on his personal observations of some of his 
colleagues. Yet unfortunately, the book is neither structured nor 
argued as an autobiography.17 Here are some of the many 
generalizations one finds in the book drawn from one knows not 
where: 
• “Most judges who oppose abortion rights do so because of 
religious belief rather than because of a pragmatic assessment of 
such rights.”18 
• “A judge in a nonjury proceeding who has to decide whether to 
believe a witness’s testimony will often have formed before the 
witness begins to testify an estimate of the likelihood that the 
testimony will be truthful.”19 
• Judges are more inclined to convict than jurors because “judges 
learn that prosecutors rarely file cases unless the evidence 
against the defendant is overwhelming.”20 
• “[M]any, maybe most, judges would if asked deny that they 
bring preconceptions to their cases[.]”21 
• “[J]udges whose background is law teaching rather than private 
practice tend to be harder on the lawyers who appear before 
them.”22 
 
 17. An intellectual autobiography by Judge Posner would be a wonderful addition to the 
sparse literature of judicial autobiography. 
 18. POSNER, supra note 5, at 13. 
 19. Id. at 65. 
 20. Id. at 68. 
 21. Id. at 72. 
 22. Id. at 74. 
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• “Appellate judges promoted from the trial court may be more 
likely than other appellate judges to vote to affirm a trial 
judge.”23 
• “[A] former trial judge promoted to the court of appeals may be 
more likely to focus more on the ‘equities’ of the individual 
case . . . and less on its precedential significance than would his 
colleagues who had never been trial judges.”24 
• “Most judges blend the two inquiries, the legalist and the 
legislative, rather than addressing them in sequence.”25 
• “Accustomed to making nonlegalist judgments in the 
[nonroutine cases], the judge is likely to allow nonlegalist 
considerations to seep into his consideration of the [routine 
case].”26 
• “Intuition plays a major role in judicial as in most decision 
making.”27 
• “[T]here are a few professions . . . in which the negative 
correlation between age and performance is weak. Judging is 
one of them, though part of the reason is that judges in our 
system are appointed at relatively advanced ages; this means 
that early decliners tend to be screened out and judges tend not 
to get bored, or run dry, at the same age at which persons in 
other fields do who have been in the same line of work for many 
years.”28 
• “Rather than a shortage of applicants for federal judgeships, 
there is a surplus.”29 
There are many more similarly rank assertions in the book. No 
studies are cited because there is nothing to cite to. The problem with 
these assertions for the most part is not that they are clearly untrue—
some of them are couched tentatively, perhaps in acknowledgement 
of the lack of data and supporting empirical research—but that, in the 
absence of data and empirical studies, it is impossible to know how 
true or untrue they are. Thus, if Judge Posner’s assertions were based 
upon data, it would be possible to test and then calibrate the 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 84. 
 26. Id. at 85. 
 27. Id. at 107. 
 28. Id. at 161. 
 29. Id. at 164. 
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significance of some of these assertions, and then to ask important 
follow-up questions. For example, to say that intuition or 
preconception plays a role in judicial decisionmaking is not to say 
anything useful. Judge Posner takes great delight in relying on 
Bayesian decision theory to make the point that judges have 
preconceptions, “priors” in Bayesian jargon,30 which can affect their 
decisions. The existence of preconception in the legal system is well 
known. Many of the procedures in a trial or other proceedings 
attempt to neutralize the effects of bias or preconception.31 In a jury 
trial, for example, lawyers and judges use voir dire to expose potential 
jurors’ preconceptions. Once exposed, the judge can address and 
neutralize these preconceptions to the satisfaction of the participants 
or the lawyer will strike the juror. Judges and lawyers constantly 
remind jurors to keep an open mind as a trial proceeds to guard 
against premature conclusions based upon only some of the evidence. 
In court trials, I frequently reminded myself to simply listen and not 
attempt to reach tentative views of how the case ultimately would be 
decided. I did not like to discuss ongoing court trials with law clerks 
or colleagues precisely because I did not wish to start characterizing 
 
 30. Judge Posner is unapologetic in his use of such jargon. “Judicial preconceptions are 
best understood, we shall see, with the aid of Bayesian decision theory. Not that this is how 
judges themselves would describe their thought process. And ‘Bayes’s theorem’ is not the only 
term I shall be using that is likely to alarm some readers of a book about judges.” Id. at 11. Like 
Monsieur Jourdain, who was so delighted and surprised to learn that he had been speaking in 
prose all of his life, see MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN 30–31 (Bernard Sahlins trans., 
Ivan R. Dee, Inc. 2000) (1670), I believe that most judges would be startled to learn that their 
preconceptions are actually Bayesian priors. I question whether Posner’s addition of this label 
advances the central preoccupation of all who are involved in the litigation process with finding 
ways of neutralizing preconception and bias—by jurors, judges, and witnesses, whether 
conscious or unconscious. Because there are no data, it is difficult to know whether unconscious 
priors have any significant effect on judges in some or most cases. As to conscious priors, I find 
it difficult to believe that a good trial judge would ever rely in significant part on a hunch or 
prior to find any material fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, addressing such 
preconceptions is one of the critical goals of a fair trial proceeding and of the rules that govern 
such proceedings. 
 31. There is a large body of literature on debiasing techniques. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, 
George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacaroff, Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 914–23 (1997) (proposing debiasing mechanisms for negotiations); 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200–02 
(2006) (considering how debiasing through law works to address a range of legal questions in 
areas “from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law”); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. 
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 
1060, 1108–15 (2006) (advocating for new debiasing techniques in the race context). One might 
expect an empirical account of preconceptions to include a thorough investigation of these 
debiasing techniques and an analysis of whether they actually work in practice. 
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the evidence until I had heard all of it. For the same reasons, many 
judges continue to instruct jurors not to discuss the case until 
deliberations have begun and the jurors have heard all of the 
evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the judge’s instructions. 
Good lawyers attempt to predict the sorts of preconceptions that a 
judge may have and then address them with either facts or 
arguments.32 Good judges are constantly on the lookout for their own 
preconceptions. When preconception rises to the level of bias, good 
judges will recuse themselves on their own motion. 
It is not nearly good enough to point out that judges and jurors, 
like others, have preconceptions. What would be useful and 
important to know is whether these preconceptions are fixed and 
strong, whether they may become fluid as a trial develops, and 
whether there are fair procedures for addressing them. Judge Posner 
does not seem to appreciate the dynamic nature of litigation and how 
many times in a case or trial a judge will rule one way and then 
reverse course later. What does this say about the strength of initial 
preconceptions? It would be important to know whether the ability to 
overcome preconception and keep an open mind is a part of the 
judicial craft that can be studied, learned, and improved upon. If 
scholars and judges could study preconceptions in some systematic 
way, they could ask many interesting empirical questions about them. 
And they might develop new methods for neutralizing, cabining, or, 
at least, revealing their role. Without data, however, Posner is at a 
loss to move forward our understanding and procedures. His bare 
assertion that judges are prisoners of their conscious and unconscious 
preconceptions diminishes the judicial role and the striving by 
conscientious judges for objectivity and fairness. His assertion will 
become fodder for ideologues who believe that everything is 
“political” and that all relationships are defined by power.33 
 
 32. When I was the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California from 1986–1990, 
my office lost a suppression motion involving the search of a home that contained a 
methamphetamine laboratory, because the judge found that the affiant had omitted from the 
affidavit that the surveillance officers had seen young children present at the scene. The judge 
assumed that young children would not typically be present at the site of a methamphetamine 
lab because of the danger of explosion and fire, and that therefore this was material information 
detracting from probable cause. It was a failure of advocacy not to demonstrate to the judge that 
this assumption was incorrect: Methamphetamine manufacturers often show little concern for 
the safety of their children or neighbors. 
 33. In my brief experience as a law teacher, I find that law students are particularly 
susceptible to the belief that judges are political actors who routinely decide cases according to 
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Another empirical problem with the book as a description of 
how judges think is that Judge Posner is simply uninterested in the 
vast majority of cases that come before the courts. At least at the 
appellate level, he concedes that judges will decide the quotidian case 
in precisely the same way. The law will be clear, or clear enough, and 
the facts will be uncontested, assumed, as on an appeal from a 
summary judgment ruling, or found by the court below by trial or 
hearing. Applying the law to the facts in these cases may require a 
degree of discernment and elbow grease, but most appellate judges 
will come to the same conclusions on the arguments presented. In 
Posner’s lexicon, these cases can be decided by the application of 
“legalist” techniques, which treat the law as a system of rules that 
produces predictable outcomes based on logic, reason, precedent, and 
common sense. These cases do not interest Posner even though, he 
concedes, they account for most of the cases that appellate judges are 
thinking about.34 It is these cases that end up in “unpublished” 
dispositions from the courts of appeals.35 The overall dominance of 
such cases within the system is probably even greater than the 
appellate statistics suggest if one considers that in many cases the 
parties do not elect to appeal from the judgment of the district court.36 
Judge Posner is interested in the comparatively few cases that 
produce disagreement among judges and that tend to end up in the 
Supreme Court or in the casebooks. Though a fraction of the 
caseload, these are the cases that command his attention. These are 
 
their own self-interest, partisan beliefs, previous experience, and such personal characteristics as 
gender, religion, and race. 
 34. POSNER, supra note 5, at 8 (“Legalism drives most judicial decisions, though generally 
they are the less important ones for the development of legal doctrine or the impact on 
society.”). Judge Posner now concedes that although his book purports to describe how all 
judges think, it is concerned mainly with the appellate courts, see Interview, A Conversation with 
Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1816 (2009), and only a subset of their cases—
those in the “open area.” Considering that unpublished opinions account for more than 80 
percent of the appellate courts’ dockets, see infra note 35, Judge Posner is actually focused on a 
relatively small number of cases within the remaining percentage. 
 35. See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 48 tbl.S-3 (2007), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (noting that 83.5 
percent of opinions of cases in the U.S. courts of appeals are unpublished). 
 36. Many cases are not appealed at all. District judges decide them in whole or in part and 
the parties accept the rulings or come to some settlement based on their understanding of the 
value of the case according to their own “legalist” analysis. See generally U.S. Courts, Federal 
Courts Management Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 
2009) (showing that 349,969 cases were filed in federal district courts in 2008, whereas only 
61,104 appeals were filed in the courts of appeals during that same time period). 
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the cases, he contends, that cannot be decided only by reference to 
prior case law, the language of statute, and the like, but seem to call 
forth some application of the judge’s personal policy beliefs or 
judicial philosophy. These are the cases that generate disagreement 
and appeals, that drive the development of the law, and that create 
reputations for our great appellate judges. 
But the typical case must have its due in any description of how 
judges think most of the time.37 For an empiricist, the observation that 
in the vast majority of cases judges of different political stripes, 
genders, religions, races, ages, and experience all reach the same 
conclusion might be seen as the important point if one were to 
describe how judges think most of the time, instead of how appellate 
judges think a little bit of the time in uncertain cases.38 The very fact 
that judges are usually “legalists” might cause one to ask if the legalist 
approach is the starting point in every case, including those that 
eventually require the judge to draw upon policy preferences. Judge 
Posner contends otherwise. He asserts that “[a]ccustomed to making 
nonlegalist judgments in the [nonroutine cases], the judge is likely to 
allow nonlegalist considerations to seep into his consideration of the 
[routine case].”39 Why the reverse is not just as or more plausible, 
Posner does not say. And if the experience of our legal system by the 
people who use it matters, and I suggest that it should, the handling 
and disposition of the typical case would be of very great importance. 
Judge Posner is not interested in the typical case. Like some 
other appellate judges, he seems to have a deep-seated enmity toward 
the everyday case. The dislike of the average case by certain federal 
appellate judges, including Posner, became clear during the 2004 
debate over a proposed change to Appellate Rule 32.1 that made 
citable so-called “unpublished” opinions.40 The unpublished opinion, 
 
 37. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 401–08 (1985) (emphasizing 
the need to consider less-litigated constitutional provisions when creating constitutional 
theories). 
 38. See Thomas J. Mills & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
831, 841 (2008) (noting that a “great deal might be learned by incorporating unpublished 
opinions” into New Legal Realism analysis because most studies are now limited to published 
opinions that, because of their atypical nature, overstate the actual effects of judicial ideology 
and other characteristics). 
 39. POSNER, supra note 5, at 85. 
 40. The new rule invalidated local appellate rules that forbade the citation of 
“unpublished” opinions: 
Rule 32.1. Citing Judicial Dispositions 
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal 
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a misnomer given that all opinions are now published and available 
electronically, is a phenomenon of the federal circuit courts and some 
state appellate courts. Before electronic publishing, an unpublished 
opinion was truly unpublished; the court did not send the opinion to 
West or other publishers and it was usually available only to the 
parties in the litigation in slip form or in the file maintained at the 
courthouse. These opinions were not citable because they were not 
generally available, and to permit citation would give unfair 
advantage to institutional, repeat litigants who would have their own 
collections of these cases. But with the advent of electronic research 
and with the requirement that court filings be available on public 
court websites, it makes no sense to consider these opinions 
unavailable or unpublished. They are easily obtainable and they 
appear in any electronic search. Nonetheless, many of the circuits 
continued to treat such opinions as second-class citizens.41 Some 
courts denied them precedential effect, but permitted citation for 
whatever guidance the opinion might offer, but other courts went a 
step further, barring the parties from even citing the opinion on pain 
of sanctions. Given that more than 80 percent of the output of the 
courts of appeals consists of unpublished opinions,42 this prohibition 
was no small matter. This is not the place to rehash the arguments 
over the rule amendment.43 The rule changed, and all unpublished 
opinions from all federal appellate courts at least may now be cited, 
even if they lack precedential force in some circuits.44 
 
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: 
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not 
precedent,” or the like; and 
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007. 
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
 41. Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the 
Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430–31 (2005) (summarizing 
the ways circuit courts treat unpublished opinions). 
 42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 43. Letter from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to David 
F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2–13 (May 6, 2005), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2005.pdf (summarizing the debates, 
arguments, and public comments over the proposed new rule 32.1); Letter from Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing 
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 53–93 (May 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf (chronicling the arguments on each side of 
the debate); see also Schiltz, supra note 41, at 1458–90. 
 44. See supra note 40. 
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Judge Posner lined up with the opponents to the rule change in 
his circuit.45 Like most of his colleagues,46 he considered that citation 
of unpublished opinions would cause the judges a great deal of 
needless effort to distinguish cases that were best left undisturbed and 
unread.47 He did not think then and he does not think now that these 
cases contribute anything to our understanding of how the legal 
system works or how judges think. Yet this point of view is 
questionable given the very large number of these cases. Indeed, one 
might have expected Posner, a sometime empiricist and an observer 
of the judicial system, at least to have appreciated the use that a 
lawyer could make of unpublished opinions to mount an empirical 
argument. One reason a lawyer might wish to cite to unpublished 
opinions is to show an appellate court how a rule is actually working 
in practice, where it is being applied, whether it is being applied 
consistently, and the like. There are many contexts in which knowing 
how a rule of law is actually coming to the courts will be important to 
advocacy, to the court, and indeed to the very pragmatism that Posner 
advocates. For example, when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, 
a party might wish to show how earlier rulings demonstrate that a rule 
of law either is or is not “clearly established.” Or if one wishes to 
argue about the consequences of a particular rule of law for other 
cases and factual circumstances—and consequences are the lodestar 
of Posner’s pragmatism—one would want to look at the vast majority 
 
 45. Letter from Richard A. Posner et al., to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. 
on Appellate Rules 1 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Appellate_ 
Comments_2003/03-AP-396.pdf. 
 46. Judge Easterbrook was a notable exception. See Letter from Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Circuit Judge, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
1 (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Appellate_Comments_2003/03-AP-
367.pdf; see also Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion; Should Judges Make More Rulings 
Available as Precedent? How an Obscure Proposal Is Dividing the Federal Bench, LEGAL 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at 1 (quoting Judge Easterbrook’s remark that barring citations to 
unpublished opinions “implies that judges have something to hide”). 
 47. A letter to the Appellate Rules Committee Chair read, in part: 
Because the order is not citable, the judges do not have to spend a lot of time 
worrying about nuances of language. . . . [We] do not need to worry about nuances of 
language because the order will not be thrown back in our faces someday as a 
precedent. And thrown back they will be, no matter how often we state that 
unpublished orders though citable (if the proposed rule is adopted) are not 
precedents. For if a lawyer states in its brief that in our unpublished opinion in A v. B 
we said X and in C v. D we said Y and in this case the other side wants us to say Z, we 
can hardly reply that when we don’t publish we say what we please and take no 
responsibility. We will have a moral duty to explain, distinguish, reaffirm, overrule, 
etc. any unpublished order brought to our attention by counsel. 
Letter from Richard A. Posner et al., supra note 45, at 1. 
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of cases in which the consequences are most likely to occur. In this 
sense, the unpublished opinion contains important data, not because 
the reasoning in the opinion may or may not be persuasive, but 
because of the very existence of the opinion, the outcome, and the 
controversy. Yet Posner is not interested in such data, and one may 
wonder why.48 
This tendency to undervalue the data and the processes of the 
legal system is observable in How Judges Think in additional ways. 
Judge Posner purports to describe how all judges think, but he seems 
to have very little feel for the trial court and for the role of the bar 
and the parties. There is hardly any discussion of the influence on 
judicial thinking of the briefs, the arguments, and the lawyers’ 
strategic decisions to press certain contentions and let others slide. 
The failure to discuss the effect of lawyering on how judges think 
leaves the impression that the briefs and other work product, 
including argument and direct- and cross-examination, are not of 
much significance. I disagree with this, and I think other trial judges 
would as well. In a courtroom, with the parties often present and 
intensely interested in the fairness of the proceedings, a judge feels 
quite constrained to address the questions and issues presented by the 
lawyers. A judge who declines to address those issues will appear 
unfair or biased. Similarly, a judge who generates arguments that the 
lawyers did not raise will appear to assist one side or the other. 
Lawyers and parties who face a judge acting as a roving commissioner 
will view the judge as yet another adversary in the courtroom, and as 
biased or even co-opted in some way. Perhaps I overstate these 
constraints or perhaps I was too sensitive to them as a judge. The 
point is that in a description of how all judges think, it leaves a huge 
 
 48. If the reason were simply the time it would take to distinguish the reasoning or holding 
in such cases, and a view that the cases are so inadequately prepared that they do not deserve 
this expenditure of time and attention, then it should satisfy that the cases have no precedential 
value and the court is free to ignore their reasoning and wording. But in an interview posted on 
the How Appealing website, Judge Posner indicates that he neither understands nor could 
accept such an approach: 
I don’t like the idea of allowing unpublished opinions to be cited, which is another 
way of saying that I think courts should be permitted to designate some of their 
decisions as nonprecedential and therefore not worth citing. (Apparently under the 
new rule, we won’t be allowed to forbid citation of unpublished opinions, but will be 
allowed to deny precedential force to them, a combination that seems to me to make 
no sense.) 
20 Questions for Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, HOWAPPEALING.COM, Dec. 1, 2003, http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2003_12_01_20q-
appellateblog_archive.html. 
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hole to ignore the effect of lawyers and their clients, and the need to 
run a fair courtroom, on judicial thinking. 
Nor does Judge Posner consider the way in which the record is 
developed in a case and the constraints that the record might impose 
on a fair-minded trial or appellate judge. Trial judges spend a good 
deal of their time deciding what evidence is sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted. Lawyers devote their attention to challenging and 
countering testimony that they view as misleading or inaccurate. The 
system imposes certain requirements, most notably, in the common 
law tradition, that witnesses cannot “mail” it in. They have to submit 
themselves to rigorous questioning under oath. 
And this process for reliable, fair, and transparent factfinding 
points to another problem in Judge Posner’s theory and discussion: 
He never addresses how a carefully constructed factual record relates 
to his theory of pragmatic judging. Yet without such a record, 
pragmatic judges are at sea and at large, making it up according to 
their own lights. For Posner, a good judge is one who develops the 
law in directions that are sensible and that produce beneficial 
consequences for society.49 This is unobjectionable if the judge 
includes the lawyers in this quest such that there is a sound factual 
basis in the record—data—upon which the judge reliably can project 
those consequences. But judges who think that they know what is 
sensible or beneficial merely by dint of education or intellect are just 
as formalist as the “legalists” to the degree that they rely upon a fixed 
set of theories of human nature, economics, history, or political 
economy out in the ether to deduce rules of law, rather than building 
such rules from the ground up by responding to the particular facts of 
a particular situation and dispute. The trial judge who, after hearing 
argument, honestly identifies what the grounds of decision will be and 
permits the parties to address those grounds and develop in the 
record a factual basis in support or derogation of those grounds—
including consequences to the greater society, if those consequences 
will be a basis for the decision—is to my mind the best trial judge. 
Similarly, the appellate judge who plays by the rules, abiding by the 
record presented and remanding to the district court for additional 
factfinding when necessary, is the best kind of appellate judge. And 
these judges are neither legalists nor pragmatists. These judges are 
empiricists. 
 
 49. See POSNER, supra 5, at 13 (“A pragmatic judge assesses the consequences of judicial 
decisions for their bearing on sound public policy as he conceives it.”). 
